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Abstract: A discussion of the scope that exists for the normative assessment of blame. The paper 
starts from the assumption that blame is to be understood in terms of the reactive attitudes. A 
particular crux is the question of whether blame can be assessed critically if conditions are in 
place that render the reactive attitudes apt or warranted. The paper argues that even warranted 
blame can be managed critically, and that this is something we often have reason to do, given 
the oppositional nature of reactive blame. The point is illustrated through a discussion of 
forgiveness and hypocrisy. A further claim is that, once reasons for reactive blame are 
distinguished from distinct reasons for managing it in different ways, space opens up for 
interesting global challenges to reactive blame, even when it is internally apt or warranted. 
 
 
Blame is naturally understood in terms of the reactive attitudes, such as resentment and 
indignation. To blame someone is to be exercised emotionally about what they have done, and 
the reactive attitudes are paradigmatic cases of being exercised in this distinctive way. My 
question in the present paper is the following: what scope does the reactive account allow for 
the critical assessment of blame? 
 One view, which I shall call the warranted attitude account, holds that reactive blame is 
subject to critical assessment solely in terms of considerations that might or might not render it 
fitting or appropriate. If another person has wronged you, then you have a reason to resent 
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them, and this alone is sufficient to render your blame warranted; blame is in this way like 
distrust, which is a fitting way of relating to individuals who have shown themselves to be 
unreliable. A different view emphasizes the character of reactive blame as a form of angry 
disapprobation. It holds that anger is essentially unintelligible in virtue of the hostile action 
tendencies that it essentially involves. According to this approach, blame is always 
questionable, even when it responds to considerations we would ordinarily understand to be 
reasons for attitudes such as resentment. 
 I wish to sketch a position that is intermediate between these two extremes. In 
particular, I agree that the character of blame as angry disapprobation raises normative 
questions about it, even when it responds to wrongs or moral injuries. But it is an overreaction 
to conclude that angry disapprobation is inherently questionable. I shall argue, first, that blame 
is unlike distrust in being an essentially oppositional stance; it does not merely register 
transparently the facts to which it is a response, but comes between people as a psychological 
reality with its own weight and significance. I argue, second, that oppositional states of this 
kind are functionally intelligible to those who are subject to them, at two complementary levels. 
They connect us to an economy of social disesteem that crucially facilitates norm-compliant 
behavior in human communities; they also play a constructive role within the interpersonal 
contexts that link wrongdoers with those whom they have wronged. I argue, third, that reactive 
attitudes can be managed in different ways, even when conditions are in place that render them 
warranted as responses to their objects. This is shown by brief reflection on forgiveness and 
hypocritical blame, which illustrate the scope for assessing our managerial practices by 
reference to moral and other reasons for action. I argue, finally, that there is a foothold in 
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normative assessment of this kind for a global critique of moral blame, even if the attitudes that 
it involves are not inherently unintelligible. 
 
1. Reactive Blame and its Warrant. 
Blame is an elusive and protean phenomenon, one that seems resistant to hard-edged analysis. 
But one of its characteristic forms is what we might call reactive blame, whereby we respond 
emotionally to moral infractions, with attitudes such as resentment, indignation, and guilt. 
Emotions of this class have come to be referred to, following P. F. Strawson, as reactive 
attitudes.1 Strawson himself took our susceptibility to such attitudes to be constitutive of our 
participation in normal interpersonal relationships, and also to involve the attribution to those 
to whom we are so related of moral accountability. These claims are far from self-evident, of 
course, and there is room for dissent about both of them. For purposes of discussion in this 
paper, however, I wish to grant the recognizably Strawsonian thesis that the reactive attitudes 
involve at least one familiar form of blame for actions that are morally impermissible.2 
 Reactive blame, construed along these lines, is a matter of attitudes rather than actions. 
To blame a person in this way for something they have done is not to do anything oneself, but 
to be subject to a reactive attitude, such as resentment, that is directed toward the wrongdoer. 
But attitudes of this kind are answerable to their own, distinctive reasons. These may be 
construed as considerations that render the attitudes in question fitting or warranted or apt. 
Examples of normative considerations of this kind include facts about the danger that is posed 
to a person by a situation or an object in their immediate environment, which can make it fitting 
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for the person to experience the emotion of fear; or facts about an individual’s trustworthiness 
and reliability, which generally render it warranted to invest trust in the individual.3 
 Reasons for attitudes such as these do not render it mandatory or required for people to 
adopt the attitudes in question; in part this is because it is not always under our control whether 
we have attitudes of the kind that would be appropriate to the circumstances we find ourselves 
in. But the reasons in question provide a baseline for the direct normative assessment of the 
attitudes that they purport to regulate. Trust, for instance, is out of place when it is invested in 
someone who has been shown to be untrustworthy; and fear tends toward the pathological 
when it is directed at situations or objects that do not pose some real danger for the person who 
is subject to it. By the same token, attitudes of these kinds generally make sense when 
conditions in place that render them apt or warranted.4 
 In the case of reactive blame, the attitudes at issue are also answerable to reasons of this 
general kind. The considerations that render these attitudes fitting or appropriate involve, in the 
most general terms, the violation of basic moral requirements or norms. Resentment, for 
instance, might well be apt in circumstances in which another person has betrayed a confidence 
or broken a promise or inflicted suffering or humiliation. More specifically, the conditions that 
make this attitude fitting have something to do with the morally questionable quality of will of 
the agent at whom they are directed.5 We resent people, characteristically, when their objective 
violation of moral requirements reflects a failure to take those requirements seriously, as bases 
for the regulation of their own conduct (where such failures may range from flagrant dismissal 
of the requirements to the negligent disregard of them in deliberation about what to do). More 
specifically still, resentment is warranted under conditions in which the agent’s disregard of 
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moral requirements involves, in particular, an attitude of disregard for the individual who is 
subject to resentment. You resent someone when they have wronged you through their actions, 
where this is a matter of their having flouted claims you have against them, or acting without 
consideration for what they owe specifically to you.6 The aptness conditions for this paradigm 
of reactive blame thus involve violations of moral requirements that have a relational character, 
being requirements that are owed to other individuals, and that are connected to claims that 
those individuals have against the agent to compliance with them.7 This is a theme to which I 
shall return later in this paper. 
 These points about the fittingness conditions for the attitudes involved in reactive blame 
strike me as relatively uncontroversial. Resentment and the other reactive emotions are clearly 
answerable to normative considerations that can render them warranted or lacking in warrant. 
This shows itself in our judgment that it wouldn’t be apt or fitting to feel resentment toward 
someone who hadn’t wronged you in any way at all. The question is whether these fittingness 
conditions provide the only legitimate basis for the normative assessment of reactive blame. 
 Some philosophers appear to answer this question in the affirmative. On what I shall call 
the “warranted attitude” approach, reactive blame is admissible whenever the immediate 
conditions are in place that would render it fitting or apt. Further conditions, about for instance 
the freedom of the agent to do otherwise or their capacity to control their conduct by reference 
to the moral standards they are blamed for flouting, do not enter into it.8  
 This way of thinking about things appears to undermine, at a stroke, a large part of the 
basis for the traditional debate about free will as a condition for moral blameworthiness. 
Philosophers who join that debate typically assume that there is a real question to be addressed 
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about whether it can ever be fair to blame agents for their actions in a world in which 
everything happens in accordance with deterministic laws, or in which human agency is 
understood as essentially part of the order of nature. Pessimists, to follow P. F. Strawson’s 
terminology, traditionally return a negative answer to this question, while more optimistically 
inclined philosophers defend the conclusion that it can be fair or reasonable to blame people for 
their moral failings even if they lacked ultimate freedom of the will. Strawson himself felt that 
the traditional debate between optimists and pessimists was in some way ill conceived, and the 
warranted attitude approach offers a way of articulating this idea.9 Resentment and the other 
reactive attitudes are made fitting or appropriate by the quality of will that others display 
toward us in their interactions with us. But if someone has shown contempt for our basic 
interests or disregard for the claims we have against them, then that is sufficient to establish 
that resentment would be a warranted response. Questions about whether blame would be fair 
if the agent who harbored these attitudes of disregard toward us lacked freedom of the will or 
the capacity to control their behavior do not so much as get a foothold.10 
 It is illuminating to compare reactive blame to distrust in this respect.11 Trust is a 
complicated and elusive phenomenon, which I do not propose to analyze here. But however 
exactly trust is understood, it involves, in part, a tendency to rely on the person in whom trust is 
invested: to have confidence that they will live up to their responsibilities and be true to their 
word, and to plan one’s own activities on the assumption that the person who is trusted will 
comport themselves in this way. Understood along these lines, trust clearly involves attitudes 
that are assessable by reference to their own norms of aptness or warrant. People can, after all, 
be more or less trustworthy or reliable, and it is appropriate to calibrate the trust we invest in 
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people to the degree to which they do or do not exhibit these properties. If someone has 
betrayed your trust, or shown themselves generally to be an unreliable partner to interpersonal 
undertakings, then it would be fitting for you to adopt an attitude toward them of severely 
reduced trust. This attitude of distrust, furthermore, seems warranted, independently of 
whatever further facts may obtain about the freedom or moral powers of the person to whom it 
is directed. Someone who is unreliable should simply not be trusted, and the attitude of trust is 
entirely justified so long as this condition is met. 
 Trust is, of course, a significant human good. It is to our advantage to be able to stand in 
trust-based relationships with other people, which are both valuable in themselves, and a 
condition for a range of other goods. Among other things, our ability to coordinate our activities 
with others, and to benefit from mutually advantageous cooperative arrangements, will be 
seriously threatened if others are unwilling to invest trust in us. But these facts about the 
untoward effects of distrust on the person who is its target do not provide an independent basis 
for the normative assessment of it. When people have shown themselves to be unreliable, then it 
is entirely warranted for others to withdraw whatever trust they may have placed in them, 
notwithstanding the negative consequences this may have for the unreliable party. So, too, with 
reactive blame, according to the warranted attitude approach. Resentment and the other forms 
of reactive blame are typically not attitudes that are welcomed by the person who is their target. 
It is disconcerting to have such attitudes directed at you, something that we typically would 
prefer not to experience. But the proponent of the warranted attitude approach will insist that, 
as in the case of distrust, these untoward effects provide no independent basis for the normative 
assessment of reactive blame. If someone has wronged you, then resentment is an apt reaction; 
 8 
the fact that responding to the wrong in this way might be unwelcome to the person who is its 
target does not provide a reason against the attitude, or undermine the considerations that 
make it fitting in the first place. 
 
2. The Maximalist Critique of Blame. 
Having sketched the warranted attitude approach, I would now like to present a contrasting 
position, which holds that reactive blame is inherently problematic—even when conditions are 
in place that would seem to render it fitting. This position starts with the observation that the 
reactive attitudes are emotions in the register of anger, and that anger is an essentially 
oppositional state. Attitudes of this kind differ from the example of trust in that they set the 
person subject to them at odds with the person at whom they are directed. Anger is typically 
occasioned by something another person has done, who may be understood to be the target of 
the emotion. But its characteristic manifestation is as something that comes between the subject 
and the target, setting the former against the latter. A primitive but intelligible expression of this 
oppositional character might be the disposition to harm or to lash out at the target of anger, 
something we could make sense of by adverting to the emotional state that is thus expressed. 
But anger is oppositional even in cases in which hostile action tendencies of this kind are absent 
or suppressed or sublimated into something less nakedly destructive. It is an emotional 
condition that does not merely register transparently the presence of the circumstances that 
may have occasioned it, but that has weight in its own right, as something that comes between 
the subject and the target, and sets them at odds with each other.  
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 This is something that is familiar to all of us from the context of our intimate 
relationships. We are exceptionally sensitive within these contexts to the presence of angry 
emotions on the part of persons that we are very close to; we can discern such emotions in the 
subtle emphasis with which our partners stack the dishes after supper or close the door on their 
way to work. Furthermore, the emotional state to which we are thus attuned is one that has 
interpersonal significance in its own right, as something that needs to be acknowledged and 
dealt with. The partner who is angry at you may have no effective disposition to lash out at you 
or to inflict suffering. But the emotion sets them against you, all the same, figuring as an irritant 
in your ongoing relations to each other. Its phenomenology makes salient and persistent the 
circumstance that occasioned it, so that the subject is prone to dwell on those circumstances, in 
ways that make it difficult for the parties to move on so long as it persists. It is inherently a 
source of social friction and disharmony, and in this way something of an oppositional reality.  
 The oppositional character of angry emotions bears on a different question that has been 
raised about blame, which concerns its characteristic force. It is natural to think that to blame 
someone for something is different from merely registering the wrong that was done by the 
agent, and different specifically in its force. This aspect of blame becomes salient when we think 
of it from the perspective of the agent who is its target. To be on the receiving end of blame is to 
be aware of another party as set against one somehow, on account of something one has done to 
them or to someone else. The oppositional character of angry disapprobation explains this 
important dimension of blame, and this contributes significantly to the plausibility of the 
reactive account of the phenomenon. The affective and dispositional features of anger that give 
it its interpersonal significance correspond very closely to our intuitive sense of its characteristic 
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force. Blame goes beyond the registering of wrongdoing by another party, precisely in virtue of 
involving attitudes that of their nature come between the blamer and the person who is blamed. 
 But this oppositional aspect of angry disapprobation also figures prominently in its 
maximalist critique. To be set against someone, in the way characteristic of anger, is to relate to 
them in a way that can easily seem questionably intelligible, as Martha Nussbaum has recently 
argued.12 Nussbaum’s account centers around an interpretation of the oppositional element in 
angry disapprobation, which she takes essentially to involve the desire that harm should befall 
the person at whom anger is targeted. This quest for “payback”, as Nussbaum thinks of it, is 
something that can be rendered intelligible only if it fits into a larger pattern of evaluative 
assumptions that are themselves justifiable. But Nussbaum denies that the desire for payback 
makes evaluative sense in this way.13 The thought that is implicit in anger is that it would be 
good if the target of the emotion were to suffer harm, and good on account of the wrong that 
the target agent has committed. These ideas might make sense if we could understand the 
payback to be visited on the agent as negating or in some way compensating for the bad that 
the agent has already committed. But as many philosophers have observed, to think in these 
terms is to indulge in wishful thinking.  
 A wrongful action, once committed, cannot be undone by anything that might later be 
visited on the agent, nor can its character as wrongful be affected such ex post facto afflictions. 
The only thing that might reliably link the past wrongdoing to the later infliction of harm on the 
wrongdoer is the sensibility of the angry person who inflicts the harm, which could include a 
disposition to take pleasure in the wrongdoer’s suffering. But it is hard to see in this 
Nietzschean mechanism a genuine evaluative justification for the infliction of harm on the 
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wrongdoer. Any pleasure that might be experienced by the victim of wrongdoing seems tainted 
by its sadistic character. More fundamentally, an evaluative account will render intelligible the 
desire for payback only if it identifies some independent good that would be realized by the 
satisfaction of that desire; but the appeal to pleasure treats the desire as a brute given, a 
primitive source of satisfaction rather than something that tracks independently valuable states 
of the world. 
 Attention to the oppositional character of reactive blame thus raises a basic question 
about its internal plausibility. If angry disapprobation essentially involves the desire that the 
target of the emotion should suffer harm, this way of relating to others may not make 
evaluative sense. This is true, moreover, even if the target of reactive blame did in fact act so as 
to wrong another party, which is the kind of circumstance that we understand to render the 
reactive attitudes fitting or warranted. 
 
3. Making Sense of Oppositional Blame. 
I agree with Nussbaum that the payback story is deeply implausible. To counter the maximalist 
critique of blame, we need an account of angry disapprobation that detaches from it the desire 
for harm that Nussbaum takes to be its essential feature, while still doing justice to its 
oppositional character. We also need a broader story about why it is important to us that we 
should have oppositional reactions to wrongdoing in our emotional repertoire. I take up these 
tasks in the present section, sketching in very broad strokes a constructive interpretation of 
oppositional blame.14 
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 There is no question that anger can give rise to violent and aggressive behavior. As I 
noted above, people sometimes deliberately act so as to inflict harm on other persons, and anger 
is a possible source of actions of this kind. But anger can generate social friction, and represent 
an oppositional reality, even when it is felt by agents who have completely sublimated any 
residual desires to harm or lash out at those who are the targets of their attitudes. This is in fact 
how we experience it in our social relations with friends and relatives who do not harbor 
genuine desires to see us suffer harm. As in the earlier example involving anger within an 
intimate relationship, the emotion, when present, tends to come between the parties to the 
relationship. The person subject to it is upset about something that the other party has done, 
and is disposed to confront the other person about it and to tolerate the social friction that this 
might occasion. Anger is a way of being exercised about a past action that sets us against the 
agent of the action, as I put it above; but the core behavioral manifestation of this attitude is not 
so much the desire for payback as the inclination to confront the target person, to lodge a 
protest against what that person has done, and to focus the attention of both parties on the 
action protested against, as something that needs to be dealt with.15   
 To be on the receiving end of an oppositional emotion such as this is generally 
unpleasant. We have an innate tendency to value harmonious relations with the people whom 
we encounter as we make our way through life. Or at least most of us do: part of the fascination 
of the Larry David character in the HBO series “Curb Your Enthusiasm” is his utter immunity 
to the forms of discretion and silence that facilitate and sustain frictionless relations with the 
individuals who inhabit our social world. This is sort of mesmerizing to watch, because it goes 
so strongly against the grain for most of us. Anger, with its associated disposition to confront 
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and to protest, is a powerful counter to this natural tendency to maintain social harmony, 
prompting us to stand up to people who commit infractions against us rather than ignoring 
those infractions and carrying on as if nothing had happened. Moreover, the same tendency to 
harmony renders it acutely uncomfortable to be the target of angry disapprobation, which is a 
condition that most of us have an innate aversion to. These connected aspects of anger make it 
fitting to characterize it as an intrinsic source of social discomfort and unease.  
 To say that anger generates a kind of social friction to which we are typically averse, of 
course, is not to say that it involves an innate desire that its target should suffer harm. Those 
who attribute to anger a desire for payback of this kind generally think of the harm to be visited 
on the target as distinct from the anger with which it is associated, involving something like the 
bodily damage and physical pain that might be suffered when the angry person lashes out. My 
point, instead, is that anger is itself a syndrome that it is unpleasant to experience. For those 
subject to it, anger pushes them to stand up to others and oppose them, putting them into a 
form of social relation that we are typically strongly motivated to avoid. This same form of 
social relation is even more uncomfortable for the individuals who are the targets of blame, 
leaving them estranged and alienated from other members of their social world. These 
important aspects of anger are the result of interactions between the oppositional character of 
anger and our inherent sociability: our innate concern for the esteem or disregard that other 
individuals harbor toward us. But anger can thrust us into aversive relations of this kind even if 
it does not itself involve an essential desire to harm or to inflict discomfort.  
 Interpreted correctly, the aversive character of oppositional blame can help to render it 
intelligible, in general terms, as an element within our emotional repertoire. I would distinguish 
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two stages of analysis. First, anger in its undifferentiated form seems continuous with emotional 
reactions to which other social animals are subject, which subserve the function of incentivizing 
norm-compliant behavior on the part of individual members of the species. Anger is a 
syndrome that disposes individuals to respond to threats and slights with behavior that 
confronts and challenges the perpetrator. The overt manifestations of this primitive tendency 
function to attach penalties to anti-social behavior on the part of group members, and this 
promotes the important goal of keeping them in a cooperative rather than competitive mode of 
interacting with each other. But social animals are sensitive to each other’s attitudes, and have 
some capacity to keep track of those attitudes over time; we may speculate, accordingly, that 
attitudes of hostility and oppositional confrontation can help to incentivize cooperative 
behavior even when they do not give rise to overt sanctioning behavior.  
 It is very plausible that the generic capacity to experience emotions in the key of anger 
evolved developmentally in virtue of its ability to contribute in these ways to incentivizing 
cooperation. Anger seems an important mechanism whereby social creatures signal to each 
other that there are lines that are not to be crossed, and this is surely at least part of the story 
about how it emerged in the first place as a stable part of our emotional equipment. But if this 
much is correct, we may well wonder whether human beings would be able to internalize and 
comply with the basic moral norms that enable cooperation among us in the absence of this 
emotional tendency. A form of life in which we overcame these emotional tendencies might be 
one in which our ability to learn to comply with cooperative moral norms would be drastically 
diminished. Our susceptibility to such tendencies connects us to each other in an economy of 
 15 
regard and disesteem, where this in turn seems important to our ability to achieve a cooperative 
equilibrium in our ongoing interactions with other members of our community. 
 At the first stage of analysis, we reflect on continuities between human anger and 
similar emotional reactions that contribute to maintaining cooperation in other social animals. 
In a second stage, we attend more closely to the refinement of basic anger into the reactive 
attitudes that I have asserted to be essential to moral blame. As I noted in section 1 above, these 
attitudes are commonly and correctly understood to rest on the importance we attach to the 
attitudes that others take toward us. Strawson observed that resentment and its ilk are crucially 
responses to the ill-will and indifference that others display toward us;16 they in this way have 
an inherently social content, being triggered by actions that display a lack of regard for us. They 
reflect, further, a sense that some minimal level of regard or good will is owed by members of 
our communities to each other. In feeling resentment about something another person has done, 
we are in effect, as Strawson further observed, demanding that the target of our emotional 
reaction should have acted otherwise.17 This is directly connected to the idea that the conditions 
that immediately warrant the reactive attitudes are ones in which the bearer of the attitudes has 
been wronged by the party at whom they are directed. The sense of a wrong or a grievance that 
is latent in these emotions presupposes that there is a basic level and quality of interpersonal 
regard that people owe to each other, and that the wrongful party in a particular interaction is 
someone who has not lived up to this interpersonal expectation.  
 Reactive blame, understood along these lines, has some additional features that 
contribute to its generic value and importance; I wish to highlight two of them. The distinctive 
character of resentment and the other reactive attitudes, first of all, contributes to the legibility 
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of moral standards as genuine demands or practical requirements, rather than merely 
aspirational values that it might be desirable (but optional) for individuals to realize in their 
lives. They play this role in virtue of being refinements of anger that reflect demands we impose 
on each other for a basic level of good will or regard. Moral standards represent practical 
requirement in the first place, in part, insofar as they are understood to define expectations that 
are owed to other parties, which suits them to function interpersonally as demands that we 
address to each other. They are understood to play this role, furthermore, insofar as violation of 
the standards attracts reactions in the register of anger. To be subject to moral requirements, 
most fundamentally, is to be subject to standards that define what we owe to each other as 
persons, and that provide others with a basis for angry disapprobation when they are 
disregarded or flouted. The susceptibility to reactive anger, then, is not merely something that 
helps to incentivize norm-compliant behavior; it contributes, more basically, to rendering moral 
norms intelligible to agents as practical requirements or obligations. It is not clear that we 
would understand ourselves to be under moral requirements that regulate our interactions with 
each other in a world in which we lacked capacities for the kind of angry disapprobation 
represented by the reactive attitudes. 
 Attitudes of this kind, I have suggested, reflect a conception of ourselves as having 
claims against other people to a minimal level of consideration and regard; this is part of what it 
is to think about moral standards as defining requirements that we owe to each other. Reactive 
blame is a reaction specifically to the flouting of a moral claim, and we may think of the 
individuals who experience it as asserting their claims interpersonally. The resentful party does 
not merely acquiesce in the display of ill will or disregard toward them, but is exercised about it 
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emotionally, in ways that dispose them to stand up to the perpetrator and confront them about 
what the perpetrator did. These aspects of reactive blame point to a further and distinct value 
that it helps to constitute.  
 A community whose members have the reactive attitudes in their repertoire, and who 
understand each other to be entitled to those attitudes in response to the violation of 
interpersonal claims, confers on its members a distinctive kind of standing. It is the standing to 
assert claims on one’s own behalf in one’s relations with those who would trample on them, 
which connects in turn with an attractive conception of individuals as equipped with dignity 
and self-respect. To respect oneself, in the relevant sense, is to take there to be a basic level of 
consideration and regard that is owed to one by the other people who inhabit one’s social 
world, and to be prepared to assert one’s claims to compliance with these basic standards of 
interpersonal regard through one’s susceptibility to reactive blame.18 People who are equipped 
with these reactions and prepared to express them when they are called for will be willing to 
stand up for themselves, and to protest on their own behalf against infringements of their basic 
moral claims. Indeed, it seems to me plausible to suppose that the reactive attitudes are 
essential to our conception of ourselves as bearers of moral claims in the first place, since to 
have a claim of this kind against someone is to see oneself as having warrant for reactive blame 
on occasions when the claim is flouted. 
 This has necessarily been an abbreviated discussion of a topic that is complex and 
ramifying; there is much more that could be said about the functions of oppositional blame and 
about the relational content of the moral norms that give the content of the reactive attitudes. 
But I hope I have succeeded in sketching an interpretation of reactive blame that does justice to 
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its oppositional character, while depriving the maximalist critique of its basis. The key points 
are as follows: anger sometimes disposes people to act with the aim of inflicting harm on those 
at whom it is directed, but the desire for payback is not essential to this attitude. Its oppositional 
character is a function of the way it goes against the grain of our inherent sociability, coming 
between the subject of the emotion and the person at whom it is targeted, insofar as it disposes 
the former to stand up to and to confront the latter. We are innately averse to being on the 
receiving end of emotions of this kind, and this helps to illuminate their evolutionary role as 
basic mechanisms for incentivizing compliance with important social norms. Furthermore, the 
refinement of anger into the specifically reactive attitudes contributes to rendering moral 
standards intelligible as practical requirements, and it is an important element in a conception 
of individuals as endowed with dignity and self-respect.  
 By showing that the desire for payback is not essential to reactive blame, we liberate it 
from the incoherent thought that the infliction of harm on the target of anger will somehow 
negate or undo the wrong that that person originally committed. And by situating reactive 
blame in relation to important social functions and values, we help to make sense of it, as an 
element in our emotional repertoire that we have reason to embrace and to affirm. These results 
undermine the maximalist critique of angry blame, showing it to be a way of responding to 
moral infractions that is not inherently problematic. 
 
4. Managing Oppositional Reactions: Forgiveness and Hypocrisy. 
If reactive blame basically makes sense as a part of our emotional equipment, then it might 
seem that it will be in good order whenever conditions are in place that render its constituent 
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attitudes warranted or fitting. As we saw in section 1 above, these are conditions in which one 
person has been wronged by another, where the wrong reflects a failure to show sufficient 
regard or good will toward to the party who was wronged. According to the warranted attitude 
approach, if someone has treated you in this way, then you have reason to resent them, and that 
is all there is to say about the norms that regulate reactive blame. But this conclusion is too 
swift. I now want to argue that the oppositional character of reactive blame provides a foothold 
for its normative critique, even when it is taken as established that its constituent attitudes 
would be warranted or fitting.  
 The first thing to note is that oppositional attitudes are prime candidates for being 
managed in various ways.19 As we have seen, they tend to come between the subject and the 
target of the attitude, disposing the former to confront and stand up to the latter. But there are 
different practical stances that people can adopt toward an attitude of this kind. At one end of 
the spectrum of managerial possibilities, they can accede to the oppositional state, taking the 
friction it introduces into their interpersonal relations to be a significant feature of them that 
needs to be dealt with by the parties to it. Agents who accede in this way will take themselves to 
have good reason to act on the associated dispositions to protest and confront the target of their 
reactive attitudes. They will treat the fact of their resentment to be an important dimension of 
their ongoing relationship the person who wronged them, something that has to be 
acknowledged as their relations plays out over time.  
 At the other end of the spectrum, there is the possibility of treating the oppositional 
attitude as an insignificant element in one’s biographical relations with the target of the attitude. 
One can try to overcome it or suppress it, for instance. And if such efforts are not successful, one 
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can still set one’s reactive anger to the side, treating the associated dispositions to confrontation 
and protest as behavioral tendencies that one does not have good reason to act on, even if they 
persist in some degree. To adopt one of these strategies is to take a stand on one’s own attitudes, 
reflexively affirming them or setting oneself against them as elements in one’s emotional 
biography. 
 Managerial stances of these kinds can be adopted toward many of one’s judgment-
sensitive attitudes, and it often makes sense for us to respond to them in these ways. Intellectual 
inquiry, for instance, often begins when we suspend judgment on a question that it is important 
for us to resolve, setting to the side whatever natural tendency we might have to believe a given 
answer to the question in order to conduct a disciplined investigation of the reasons that bear 
on it.20 Something similar is possible in respect to reactive emotions, when we suspend 
judgment on the moral questions embedded in them, with an eye to thinking systematically 
about the associated facts. I might find myself unreflectively inclined to resent my friend when 
she does not reach out to me during a period when I am under significant work-related stress. 
But I can put this attitude to the side in order to apply myself to understanding better the 
attitudes that underlay my friend’s prolonged inattention. For all I knew initially, she might 
have been under considerable professional pressure herself, or dealing with family emergencies 
that I had no inkling of, in which event her radio silence would not necessarily reflect the kind 
of disregard or ill will that would ordinarily warrant the kind of angry disapprobation that 
resentment represents.  
 In the cases just canvassed, judgement-sensitive attitudes are suspended so that we may 
arrive at a better view of the reasons that properly bear on them. These are reasons that make 
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the attitudes warranted or fitting, and once we have reached a stable reflective conception of 
how things stand with these reasons, we typically modify our attitudes accordingly. That is, we 
exit the state of suspended commitment, and allow those attitudes to form that are rendered 
fitting by the reasons we now judge to obtain. In the cases that are my primary concern in this 
paper, however, things are otherwise in this respect. These are cases in which the agent is 
satisfied that a given oppositional attitude would be fitting or apt, but attends to other 
considerations that have a bearing on the question of how best to manage it. Resentment may be 
known to be warranted, on account of the fact that the subject of the attitude was in fact 
wronged by the person at whom it is directed. But at a certain point it may no longer be 
productive or reasonable to continue to accede to this oppositional stance, and to treat it as a 
significant factor in one’s ongoing relations with the party whose wrongdoing renders it fitting. 
One might instead resolve to set it aside or to overcome it. These ways of managing one’s 
oppositional emotions represent exertions of one’s agency, and they are responsive to reasons of 
their own: not directly to the considerations that rendered the emotions apt in the first place, 
but to practical reasons for action, which connect to the values that might be furthered or 
inhibited by the different ways of managing the emotions that it is open to us to adopt.  
 To see how this might work in practice, it will be helpful to consider briefly two familiar 
classes of example in which agents are called on to make managerial decisions about reactive 
attitudes that are internally fitting. The first involves cases of hypocritical blame, in which 
agents are subject to reactive attitudes toward others for moral infractions that they themselves 
have committed. It seems that there is something morally problematic about this combination of 
stances. And yet the reactive agents of the hypocrite might well be perfectly warranted in light 
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of facts about how the agents against whom they are targeted have comported themselves. If 
someone has lied to you about a matter of importance, this would ordinarily constitute a moral 
wrong, of the sort that gives you warrant for resenting the lack of regard toward you that they 
have displayed. That this is the case is unaffected by the fact (if it is a fact) that you have 
routinely lied to others about matters that are similarly significant to them. So the moral 
objection to hypocritical blame in such cases has to be compatible with the fact that the attitudes 
constitutive of it might be ones that it is fitting for the hypocrite to experience. How should we 
make sense of this? 
 In my view, the answer to this question appeals to moral reasons for managerial actions 
regarding the reactive attitudes of the hypocrite.21 The hypocrite’s lack of moral standing to 
blame others in these cases can be understood in terms of the idea that there is a moral objection 
to their managing their warranted attitudes in a certain way: by acceding to them, treating them 
as significant elements in the ongoing relations they stand in to the person at whom the 
attitudes are targeted. For instance, the hypocrite might give clear expression to the reactive 
attitudes to which they are subject, and allow them to come between themselves and the person 
who has wronged them. These ways of dealing with one’s angry disapprobation involve 
exertions of one’s agency, and they are morally problematic so long as one is willing to commit 
similar wrongs oneself.22 To escape the moral complaint, it seems, one must either renounce the 
reactive blame that it is internally fitting to experience toward the person who has wronged 
one, or acknowledge and apologize for one’s own similar pattern of immorality and make a 
sincere attempt to avoid such behavior in the future. But to accord interpersonal significance to 
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one’s angry disapprobation without acknowledging and disavowing the similar things one has 
done oneself is morally objectionable.23  
 The second class of cases that illustrate the role of managerial requirements involves 
forgiveness. It is something of a staple in the extensive literature on forgiveness that it is at least 
superficially paradoxical. We are in a position to forgive another party only when that party has 
wronged us, acting toward us in ways that make it fitting to blame them for what they have 
done. But once this condition is satisfied, it seems there is nothing that the wrongdoer might 
later do that would undermine the warrant they have given their victim for continued angry 
disapprobation. As Agnes Callard has put it, our reasons to be angry at another are reasons to 
be angry forever, insofar as they are considerations that will always provide some internal 
warrant for the attitudes constitutive of blame, rendering it fitting for us to be subject to those 
attitudes.24 But if this is the case, how is rational forgiveness so much as possible? How can it 
ever be reasonable for us to forgive the wrongdoer if the reasons to which angry disapprobation 
directly responds remain indefinitely in place? 
 Answers to these questions will remain elusive so long as we attend solely to 
considerations of aptness or warrant for such reactive attitudes as resentment. But forgiveness 
begins to make sense if we expand our view to encompass the kind of managerial stances 
discussed above. It is noteworthy that the language in which we talk about forgiveness is 
deeply agential in character. Forgiving a person is something that we typically do, and the 
vocabulary we default to in analyzing the phenomenon reflects this agential aspect. To forgive 
another, it is natural to suppose, is to forswear the resentment that would be fitting or warranted 
under the circumstances, and this is a matter of managing the attitude in a certain way.25 You 
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might not be able to ensure that no trace of resentment remains in your feelings toward the 
party who wronged you. But if you forgive that party, you will have resolved to disavow such 
residual resentment as you might be subject to, treating it as an insignificant element in your 
ongoing relations with the person.26 This is a way of exercising managerial control with regard 
to an emotion that it would still be apt to experience, and I submit that we cannot make sense of 
forgiveness without distinguishing between attitudes of angry disapprobation and the agential 
stances we might adopt toward such attitudes. 
 If this way of understanding forgiveness is on the right lines, then our reasons to forgive 
should be reasons for acting in certain ways, which are distinct from the considerations of 
fittingness that provide reasons for angry disapprobation in the first place. And this is in fact 
how we tend to think about forgiveness, in practice. Thus, in what we might think of as the 
standard case it is actions of the wrongdoer that make it reasonable for the aggrieved party to 
offer forgiveness. In the cases I have in mind, the wrongdoer remorsefully acknowledges that 
they showed disregard for the party whom they wronged, apologizes for having done so, offers 
to make amends, and resolves to do better in the future. This familiar syndrome of ex post 
reactions to wrongful behavior on the part of the agent of the behavior does not undo the wrong 
that they originally visited on the other party, and so it remains fitting for that party to resent 
the agent on that account. But acknowledgment, apology, and repair can make an ex post 
difference to the question of how reactive blame is best managed by the aggrieved party. As 
noted above, we may think of reactions of this kind as forms of protest, whereby the bearers of 
moral claims assert them interpersonally, standing up for themselves against those who show 
them disregard. But protest generally makes no sense once the person to whom it is directed 
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has acknowledged wrongdoing and apologized and made amends. The aggrieved party might 
then have reason, on balance, to forswear their reactive blame, treating it as something that will 
no longer be allowed to come between the parties as their relations unfold, going forward. 
 But there are other reasons for action as well that might have a bearing on how 
warranted anger might best be managed. In one non-standard kind of case, there might be 
moral reasons for overcoming resentment even though the wrongdoers haven’t yet 
acknowledged wrongdoing or apologized and offered to make amends. Preemptive forgiveness 
in a situation with this structure can function to give the aggrieved party the moral high 
ground, and that might well be strategically advantageous in a larger political fight to combat 
injustice and oppression. This would be one way of understanding the stances of Gandhi and 
King, and it attributes to them compelling practical reasons for managing their warranted anger 
in the manner characteristic of forgiveness, in order to advance a larger moral cause.27  
 In a still different kind of case, the reasons that speak in favor of forswearing warranted 
reactive attitudes are prudential rather than moral in nature. There are circumstances in which 
continued fruitless protest can be debilitating for the protester, interfering with their ability to 
maintain emotional equilibrium and get on with their own lives. Under these conditions, the 
aggrieved party might be well-advised to overcome such resentment as they continue to feel, 
regardless of whether the person at whom it is targeted has apologized, in order to move 
forward with their own projects. This would again be a question of working to overcome or to 
forswear a reactive attitude that it would still be fitting for the individual who was wronged to 
feel.  
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5. Global Critiques of Reactive Blame. 
Reactive blame, I have argued, involves oppositional attitudes, which are prone to come 
between the subject who bears them and the individual who is their target; they are inherently 
sources of friction in human relationships, and this helps to make them intelligible as ways of 
asserting moral claims and protesting when they are flouted. I argued further that oppositional 
tendencies of this kind can be managed in different ways, illustrating the point through brief 
consideration of the cases of hypocritical blame and forgiveness. In both of these cases, we find 
that agents have reason to overcome the oppositional tendencies to which they are subject, 
suppressing them or setting them aside, and treating them as interpersonally insignificant to the 
extent they might residually persist.  
 If this much is granted, however, then space begins to open up for a moral global 
critique of reactive blame. In the examples involving hypocrisy and forgiveness, the reasons for 
overcoming angry disapprobation are comparatively local; there is something in the subject’s 
own conduct or circumstances, or in the ex post reactions of the wrongful party at whom their 
disapprobation is directed, that gives them reason to overcome their reactive blame. Once 
reasons of these kinds are acknowledged, however, the possibility comes into view that they 
generalize, so that subjects always have reason to forswear such reactive attitudes as it might be 
internally fitting for them experience. In my view, these are the terms in which we should 
understand philosophical skepticism about reactive blame. The interesting objection to this way 
of responding to wrongful behavior is not that it is evaluatively incoherent, but that there are 
compelling reasons for subjects to forswear it across the board, even on occasions when it 
would be internally fitting or warranted. I am not myself persuaded by these skeptical 
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arguments, at the end of the day, but they are not merely confused or conceptually misguided, 
and the challenges they present need to be addressed on their own terms. In the remainder of 
my discussion I shall defend this claim by sketching three different ways in which a skeptical 
account of reactive blame might be developed. 
 One form of global critique might rightly be called pragmatic. I have in mind the idea 
that acceding to oppositional anger is generally and on balance ineffective, considered as a way 
of protesting against wrongful conduct and restoring to equilibrium the relationships that it 
destabilizes.28 Even if a susceptibility to reactive blame comes naturally to us, and helps to 
render moral standards legible as requirements and to incentivize compliance with them, it is 
coherent to think that it might function to incite unproductive responses in those at whom they 
are targeted. It is certainly the case that confrontation and protest sometimes make the people 
they target defensive and prone to withdrawal. A coherent further supposition is that these are 
the default reactions of people to reactive blame, at least under contemporary conditions, and 
that their negative consequences for human social relations outweigh whatever positive effects 
they tend to bring about. The key thought here is that compliance with moral standards would 
more effectively be encouraged if we did not treat them as interpersonal requirements, but 
rather as ideals whose violation attracts constructive encouragement—in a spirit of meekness or 
generalized love—rather than remonstration and reactive blame. I do not find this suggestion 
particularly plausible myself; but it describes an intelligible scenario, resting in part on 
empirical claims about the consequences of managing reactive attitudes in one way rather than 
another. If the claims were true, then we would generally have compelling reason to work to 
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overcome reactive blame in our relations with other people, even when they treat us in ways 
that provide warrant for attitudes of angry disapproval.29  
 A second avenue of global critique would appeal to reasons of a broadly eudaimonistic 
character. I noted earlier that there are situations in which it is better for a person to try to move 
beyond their resentment about something that was visited upon them in the past; continued 
anger, however apt it might be, sometimes prevents us from moving on with our lives and 
taking advantage of such opportunities as it is still open to us to pursue. But maybe something 
like this is true not just on some specific occasions, but across the board for human agents. In 
the spirit of Stoicism, it might generally be thought advantageous for us to try to detach 
ourselves from the wrongs that we have suffered—not because doing so would better promote 
compliance with moral standards in our social world, but because of the effects of such 
detachment on the quality and character of our own existence.30 If what I said in section 3 above 
has merit, there would inevitably be some personal loss in a regime of managing our reactive 
attitudes so that we approximate to this kind of detachment; we might sacrifice, for instance, the 
kind of self-respect that goes together with a willingness to assert moral claims against others 
on our own behalf. But possibly these losses would be more than compensated by the personal 
advantages of detachment, with the result that our lives go better on the whole when we work 
to overcome those reactive attitudes toward others that their actions give us occasion to feel. 
This would be a different basis for skepticism about reactive blame, grounded in a distinct class 
of reasons for action. 
 Finally, there is a potential basis for global critique of blame in one specific set of moral 
considerations, those that involve requirements of fairness.31 Reactive blame, I have argued, is 
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inherently aversive, involving oppositional attitudes that introduce friction into human 
relationships. To accede to these attitudes when they are apt, and treat them as interpersonally 
significant, is to assent to one’s participation in a system of social pressures that subjects 
wrongdoers to unwelcome responses to their behavior. But there is a venerable philosophical 
question, discussed briefly in the first section of this paper, about whether it is ever fair to go 
along with such reactions in a world in which people lack ultimate freedom of the will. Maybe it 
would not be fair for agents to be exposed to aversive pressures of the relevant kind if they did 
not have an appropriate opportunity to avoid them. And maybe this condition is satisfied in 
turn only in a world in which it is completely up to agents themselves to determine what they 
are going to do, in a way it would not be in a world in which agency is embedded in the larger 
flow of causal processes. Freedom of the will is arguably irrelevant to the question of whether 
the reactive attitudes are fitting responses to wrongful actions. But it might not be irrelevant to 
the distinct question of whether there is a specifically moral objection to managing such 
reactions in a certain way, by going along with them and granting them an important role in 
one’s relationships with other people. If people lack the relevant kind of freedom, the result 
would be that it is generally problematic, on moral grounds, to accede to our reactive attitudes 
and to grant them significance in our relations with those who disregard the claims we hold 
against them. 
 Again, I do not myself endorse this form of global skepticism about reactive blame. But 
the challenge it describes is an intelligible one that needs to be addressed head-on rather than 
avoided or dismissed. As I noted in section 1, philosophers sometimes allege that the 
“pessimistic” view of moral responsibility founders on a confusion between the reasons to 
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which the reactive attitudes are properly responsive and moral requirements of fairness, which 
are reasons for action rather than for emotional attitudes.32 But as I have reconstructed it, the 
pessimist’s challenge acknowledges the difference between the considerations that provide 
warrant for reactive blame and the moral reasons for action that bear on the question of how 
reactive attitudes are to be managed. A different complaint about the challenge is that it has 
application only if reactive blame is understood to involve the imposition of sanctions on the 
wrongdoer, which is an implausible interpretation of what we are doing when we blame people 
morally for their conduct.33 But this complaint too is misguided. Reactive attitudes are 
oppositional stances, which introduce friction into human relationships; this is essential to their 
constructive roles as (for instance) ways of standing up for oneself and drawing social lines that 
are not to be crossed.34 But this inherently oppositional aspect of reactive blame is enough to 
give the libertarian challenge a basis. We do not need to assimilate angry disapprobation to the 
literal application of sanctions in order to raise a moral question about how it can fairly be 
regulated or managed.35  
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